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THE morality of post-war actions is little understood because jus post bellumis a relatively new area of just war thinking and non-ideal theory, becoming
prominent only after World War II. In the aftermath of a regime-changing war, a
state’s institutions are often purged of dangerous, corrupt, or culpable remnants
of the previous system, such as was seen in de-Nazification or the more recent
de-Ba’athification in Iraq. Lustration—a symbolic purification through the
assignment of collective responsibility for the previous regime’s sins and any
subsequent collective punishment for that responsibility1—is an important and
complicated affair for each of the state’s institutions and branches of government.
This article asks whether the group treatment of lustration is justified when
transitioning from an illiberal state (defined here as one that does not respect rule
of law or recognize moral individualism) to a liberal one, and uses the military as
the primary institutional example.2 The ideas are relevant to other situations, but
rather than explore lustration in general or for the regime as a whole, the focus
here is narrowed for clarity’s sake.
Lustration holds groups responsible for injustices perpetuated under the
previous regime—no more, no less. That includes, but does not require, the
delegation of punishments, which may range from prosecution, jail terms, and
reparations to purges or bans from future office. Punishment can also be purely
symbolic, such as a public condemnation that subjects guilty parties to social
disapproval. I argue that lustration should be acceptable to liberals on ethical
grounds, despite necessarily judging people in groups, and leave as a separate
policy question what in particular should be done in each post-war scenario.
Greater understanding of lustration’s moral dimensions not only helps
countries choose their most desirable form of lustration, but also contributes to
*I am grateful to Corey Brettschneider, Barbara Buckinx, Jean Bethke Elshtain, David Estlund,
Sharon Krause, Hélène Landemore, David Mapel, Emily Nacol, Robert S. Taylor, John Tomasi,
Andrew Volmert, participants in the Brown University Political Philosophy Workshop, and the
reviewers for their helpful comments and suggestions, and to the Political Theory Project at Brown
University and the Lord Sterling of Battersea Residential Fellowship for their support.
1“Lustration,” as defined here, incorporates both traditional (sacrifice or ritualistic cleansing for
expiatory purposes) and contemporary (in its application to group punishment) usages of the term.
2The military’s features as a collective agent—strict hierarchy, obedience to authority, division of
labor, and self-understanding as a collectivity—make it a more straightforward example.
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a better grasp of post-war transitional justice more broadly. The paucity of
thought about jus post bellum makes it even more difficult to straddle the divide
between retributive and distributive justice. Post-war lustration metes out
retribution because it decides what a person deserves for his actions—most likely
for the wrong of supporting an unacceptable, losing regime. It is also distributive
in nature because it guides the allocation of post-war spoils, by determining who
gets to participate in the new economic system and how the benefits and burdens
will be assigned.
A regime change’s drastic transformations to a society’s fundamental
political structure will inevitably result in lustrating some of those involved
with the previous government. At that point, we arrive at Morton’s Fork and
must choose between two equally unpalatable alternatives—chase inevitably
imperfect retribution for the past (e.g., by devoting massive resources to
ascertaining and publicizing each individual’s actions and giving him exactly
the punishment he deserves) at the expense of future reconstruction and
institution- and civil society-building, or sweep aside the past (thus denying
justice to victims of the old regime) in an effort to set the stage for future
justice. Given the need to simultaneously pursue both goals to some extent and
the reality of limited resources, perfect and complete justice will never be
achieved. The new regime’s choice along this spectrum—from greater
retribution and restitution to greater reconstruction—reflects which injustices
it prefers to live with.
Why is it important to ascertain the moral acceptability of lustration? After all,
if justice is inevitably imperfect in transition and if people will be lustrated
anyway for practical reasons, it might be best to focus pragmatically on
reconstruction and on rooting out the obviously corrupt or guilty as quickly as
possible. But in righting past wrongs, even if there is no way to avoid violating
the letter of the moral law and committing new injustices, it is still important to
try to act in the spirit of the law; hence my attempt to see if this kind of group
treatment is morally consistent with liberal theory. It is possible that liberalism
permits, or even recommends, lustration. The goal is to eventually restore both
the spirit and the letter of the moral law to the land, and that is only possible
when we know what the moral law allows or requires.
I. IS LUSTRATION MORALLY ACCEPTABLE?
Because even thoughtful and nuanced lustration involves blaming groups, instead
of treating each case individually, this poses a potential problem for liberalism’s
moral individualism. Before deciding on a group’s just deserts, one must first
explain why it is morally acceptable for liberals to sweepingly condemn and
punish everyone in a group for acts performed only by some, by virtue of their
membership in the collective. Lustration is by nature a blunt instrument, even if
one is careful to make distinctions between types within groups. Combine this
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with the necessity for speed, and not everyone will get individual consideration;
some will get greater or lesser punishments than what they personally deserve for
their actions.
While traditional, feudal, or conservative political traditions might advocate
that any collective—especially military personnel—that made its living by
following orders and behaving as a group should therefore be judged accordingly,
liberalism would seem to start from the opposite end of the spectrum and deny
such a collective remedy. Almost all transitional justice scholars stress the
importance of not accidentally punishing the innocent.3 The belief that this is
wrong in itself, even in transitional circumstances, is grounded in an unspoken
assumption of moral individualism—that each person deserves to and should
only be punished for what he individually did. The orgies of revenge and public
humiliation that have accompanied many regime and even administrative
turnovers throughout history rightly cause discomfort in liberals who wish to
avoid even the appearance of unwarranted retribution for sins that one did not
commit.4 Other liberals protest that inevitable shortfalls and mistakes in
lustration make matters worse and violate the rule of law and due process.5
So can lustration in the name of liberalism be justified? How do we introduce
group intentions while retaining individual agency? Lustration necessarily treats
individuals as members of a group, no matter how finely delineated the
sub-categories are, and this presents problems of discerning group agency and
responsibility from a collection of individual actions. This complication is
compounded when military service in illiberal regimes is compulsory, so draftees
would be held accountable not only for simply doing their jobs, but also for jobs
they might not have chosen. There is a significant element of moral luck involved,
and many soldiers are themselves the victims of unfortunate circumstances—born
into the wrong country at the wrong time and lacking other means of social
mobility or forced into compulsory military service to an illiberal government
that ends up defeated—and often serve not out of fervent desire to support an
immoral regime but simply to make do with circumstances beyond their control.
Yet, they will be punished for the bad luck that has befallen them. Furthermore,
3See, e.g.: Nalepa 2003; Rzeplin’ski 1992; Stinchcombe 1995; and Offe 1993. Also, strong and
weak retributivists differ on how to trade-off between punishing the innocent and letting the guilty go
(Alexander 1983).
4Holmes (1994) and Ost (2005), among others, criticize some post-Communist transitions in
Eastern Europe for illiberal, exclusionary practices. Polish lustration, for example, was hijacked by
conservative successors to the Solidarity party in an effort to rid the new government of their more
liberal counterparts (Ost 2005, pp. 70–4).
5Ackerman (1992, p. 88) defines the “liberal revolution” by its observance of the rule of law
(underscored by a constitution), and opposes backward-looking, corrective-justice measures because
they are divisive and politically-alienating and can lead to further abuses of power. “The search for
perfect justice is beyond human capacities,” he says; it is better to “burn the files than hire the
thousands of lawyers and bureaucrats required to spin the wheels of justice in the service of an
illusion.” To do otherwise would squander the moral capital gained from the liberal revolution, in
favor of continued illiberality. In fact, Elster (1992) champions a radical all-or-nothing approach to
lustration that he knows will inevitably result in nothing.
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lustration holds them responsible under ex post facto standards. When they
joined the military and/or committed wrongful acts under the aegis of the old
regime, they were only doing what was perfectly reasonable, legal, and expected
at the time; now, they are accountable under new standards they could not have
predicted. In light of these problematic circumstances, it seems counter-intuitive
to lustrate the unfortunate and obedient. There may be, however, good reasons
for this and not just out of expedience.
While group treatment might be justified on grounds of convenience and
realism in times of transitional justice, it need not necessarily be a temporary and
pragmatic move that must be swallowed under messy circumstances. Contrary to
both the liberal aversion to group treatment and the pragmatic acceptance of
group punishment, there are valid arguments consistent with liberalism for
wholesale lustration after a war.
This article offers four justifications consistent with moral individualism and
due process for lustration, in the wake of a regime change: (1) complicity
in a group agent that was wrong for having defended an illegitimate
regime; (2) representative responsibility for an epistemically-unreliable system;
(3) holding a political appointment made from above (executive) or below
(people); and (4) dissolution of the social contract. Each defense justifies
condemning slightly different sets of people and each has peripheral features and
applications, but within the overlapping core is the notion that lustration (of the
military in particular) is morally permissible.6
These arguments are not meant nor do they have to be exhaustive of all
possible liberal justifications. The purpose of presenting different lines of
reasoning is to defend the core concept of lustration as consistent with liberalism,
which is controversial because of its inherent group treatment. This is not
dissimilar to defending a core conception of free speech. Some notions of free
speech protect pornography, some sedition, some for children, and so forth. But
at the center of each is the idea that free speech for adults’ legitimate, peaceful
criticism of government institutions is to be protected. Similarly, this article seeks
to demonstrate the robustness of the permissibility of post-war lustration when
transitioning from an illiberal to a liberal regime.
The core notion being defended is that it is morally acceptable from a liberal
point of view to lustrate as a group all military personnel who served an illiberal
regime. The first two justifications rely on individual responsibility by placing the
onus on the individual’s membership in the military or his decision-making in and
understanding of the political system he served. The latter two show that what
appears at first to be punishment actually is not and therefore does not violate
any standards of due process. All four defenses are also capable of answering the
charge of ex post facto treatment, as none are predicated on the individual having
6For example, “representative responsibility” may also justify lustrating police forces and
bureaucrats, while “the nature of political appointments” would also pick up legislators.
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committed any wrong other than having joined a disgraced military, and
potentially apply to liberal societies switching to other types of regimes (liberal or
not) as well.
A. COMPLICITY
Soldiers, who have individually chosen or accepted membership in the military
institution, can be called to account for their participation in the shared martial
project even if they did not violate jus in bello, on a complicitous understanding
of group agency and collective action.
Persons in complicated contemporary societies are bound by overlapping
constraints, tacit consent, implicit and explicit representation, and joint
participation in complex social enterprises and institutions, and it is difficult to
assign collective culpability to individuals for “group” actions that are always
some composite of individual deeds. Often, the ability to identify individual
agency and assign individual responsibility disappears, most notably in cases of
spontaneous orders. When languages evolve, the use of money emerges, the
Chinese bind girls’ feet, or bell-bottom jeans come back into style, it does not
make sense to point to single individuals and attribute to them a defined portion
of the effect, (e.g., 1/100,000 responsibility for a fashion trend). Certainly, the
first official use of “O.K.” has been traced to a 1839 Boston Morning Post
article7, but others must hear or read the new words and spread them further, and
no one knows exactly how often a word must be used before it is considered
legitimate. In every spontaneous order, the effect of each person’s action interacts
with the effect of another person’s action and so forth (including that of people
who do not participate) to generate a phenomenon larger than the sum of its
parts and impossible to attribute wholly to particular individuals.
Determining agency is also problematic when individuals are organized. What
did it mean when “Allied armies won the Battle of the Bulge?” You could say that
Generals Eisenhower, Patton, Bradley, and Montgomery commanded 830,000
American and British soldiers who killed or wounded over 84,000 Germans and,
eventually, Hitler ordered each and every German soldier to withdraw from the
Ardennes area. Yet this does not fully express what happened. It was not just that
over a million individuals fought and killed each other until some decided to
leave. Each person belonged to a larger organization—an army—that had an
overarching goal of defeating the other army, not just in this battle but in the war.
Granted, victory was won through individual soldiers on one side killing enough
on the other so that the latter retreated, but it was the cooperation and
coordination as a larger military organization that directed every Allied soldier’s
actions toward the common goal of “defeating the German army,” rather than
“killing enough German soldiers.” In addition, each soldier’s contribution—e.g.,
7Anon 2002.
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the rounds he fired, the number of people he killed or wounded, and the
particular orders he gave or obeyed—is but a marginal part of the whole effect.
Any one soldier’s input could have been subtracted or substituted for another’s
and the result would have been the same. Neither an artillery gunner nor Patton
himself can say, “I won the battle.” Instead, he must say, “We [the Allied forces,
as a group agent] won the battle.” The cumulative and interactive effect of all the
individuals’ actions led to victory, and it is difficult to proportionally attribute
responsibility among participants. This can be expanded to the entire war—it is
the combined and cumulative effect of all the battles won and lost and of all the
participants’ actions that wins or loses a war, so that every Allied person involved
in this group agent as an army, not just involved with the army, won this war.
In what way exactly can soldiers be said to constitute a group agent and to act
collectively? To hold the individual responsible for his marginally-negligible
actions as part of a group (i.e., for being complicit), we must be able to
simultaneously recognize group and individual agency and appropriately assign
responsibility to each. An organized set of people must meet the following
conditions before it constitutes a “group agent” and can properly be said to “act
as a group”.
1) Members intend to participate in the group and see themselves as acting for
the sake of some shared goal, share overlapping (but not necessarily the
same) conceptions of the goal, and jointly will the goal, although they need
not believe the goal can be achieved. Sustained responsiveness between
members is unnecessary, but initial responsiveness is required. Any group
with shared goals and participation must at least initially coordinate on
how to achieve those goals, even if communication is one-sided, such as
from educational departments’ pre-planned teaching schedules or “how-to”
newsletters from your composting club.8
2) Members mutually expect each others’ participation in achieving the shared
end. Otherwise, nothing distinguishes this group from a set of unorganized
people milling about, trying to get into a tennis stadium in time for the
opening serve. They may all get in, but only because each person pursued
the goal of getting himself into the stadium under the constraints presented
by other people wanting the same thing, and not because each person
worked together with the others to get everyone in.
8This draws from the complicity framework of Kutz (2000, pp. 83, 90–96, 139). I add to his
notion of “group agents” because without mutual expectations or responsiveness, his conception is
so broad that it could capture almost any set of people, including spontaneous orders, so long as
individuals are aware of their potential categorization in that so-called group. Individual culpability
within spontaneous orders, however, is less meaningful than within established, organized groups.
Even if members of spontaneous orders intend to participate, they need not jointly will the goal,
overlap their goals, have mutual expectations of each other, or respond to others. The nature of a
spontaneous order—namely that it is amorphous, its composition is constantly changing, and its
boundaries cannot be accurately identified before it takes action—means that while the group’s
actions can be predicted, it cannot be said to intend to do something. It can only be said to “be doing”
or “have done” something after the fact.
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3) Members intend to achieve the goal, even if it is not any particular action
but rather simply the constitution of a group.
4) There is some essential connection between members’ ends, such that they
share the same (if general) goals. It is not enough that a private says, “My end
is to follow orders, so therefore my officer’s ends are my ends.” Their content
must overlap to some extent, beyond just the procedural connection.
Being in a military naturally accounts for an essential connection
between a soldier’s ends and those of his superiors. With the exception of
Japanese companies or Wal-Mart, few private-sector employees are
indoctrinated the way soldiers are when they enter the service. Through
rigorous training, soldiers are taught to live and breathe the military’s
values at all times and especially under duress. It demands comprehensive
obedience, though not necessarily blind acceptance. The training includes
extensive disclosure of the institution’s goals, and places the impetus on the
individual to help achieve them.
The question is how essential the connections between ends must be for
a group agent to be formed. You do not have to know all your superiors’
specific and intermediary ends; it is enough to know their general ends and
to accept them as yours. One of the primary purposes of intentional groups
is delegation and division of labor—while general ends are shared and
intermediary ends often public, there cannot be complete and universal
knowledge of everyone’s objectives in large organizations. There is full
disclosure of the fact of delegation and everyone knows that there are
intermediate goals and processes of which they are ignorant, but
subordinates are not fully aware of all their superiors’ overall and
intermediary objectives and superiors are also unaware of all their
subordinates’ supporting tasks and goals. Otherwise, it would be
impossible for any group of more than three or four to function at all. With
some, but not complete, essential connection between members’ ends, a
group agent can still be formed. One can always reject other members’
intermediary ends in retrospect.
5) Participants share and condone at least a general conception of the means.
(Tacit acceptance is enough.) If we want to preserve a notion of individual
agency within groups, then acceptance of the ends cannot automatically
include concurrence on the means.
In group settings, the means must be publicly known. For example,
most inter-war Germans sought to socially isolate and “politically and
economically disenfranchise” the Jews, and happily saw them shipped to
concentration camps where they would inevitably suffer severely. But
many Germans did not know they were being gruesomely and
systematically annihilated there. Genocide is one way of achieving the
desired goal, but not the only way, and presumably, many would not have
condoned this method. It is fair to say that “the German people are
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responsible for pervasive and often violent persecution of Jews,” but not
entirely accurate that “the German people are responsible for the
systematic genocide of the Holocaust.” Rather, “the Nazi regime and its
participants are responsible for the Holocaust.” Public knowledge of the
means is required if individuals’ wills are to be manifested in pursuit of
the collective goal—only then can members be said to be complicit.
(Members who believe they know and condone the means are, ex ante,
genuine participants in the group agent. If they were deceived about and
would not have condoned the means, however, then they would not be
considered accountable members, ex post.)
This complicity model hinges on each individual’s personal intentions, and as
such, individual participants in organized enterprises meeting these conditions—
especially a military—can be meaningfully held accountable for their membership
and for group actions, since a properly-constituted group has been formed by every
person’s exercise of autonomy in joining. Because an actor’s participation is
autonomously chosen and intentional, however, this relationship also works in
reverse, and individuals who will a shared project can also be held responsible for
their roles in it and lustratedaccordingly. (Inmanycases,persons inexecutiveoffices
would qualify for lustration on complicity grounds if the executive constituted a
group agent, for instance, if the country was ruled by a military junta, a one-party
dictatorship, or some similarly tight-knit, well-organized group.) It is important to
note that the implicationof thecomplicity frameworkhere is thatmembershipalone
in a guilty military is enough to justify a person’s lustration; he need not have
participated inanyothercrimes. Inpractice,however, lustrationpolicycan take that
into account and attempt to differentiate between degrees of culpability, especially
at the punishment stage.
B. REPRESENTATIVE RESPONSIBILITY AND THE NUREMBERG DEFENSE
Even if individuals did not personally engage in wrongdoing under the old
regime, they served as representatives of their institutions and therefore bear
some responsibility for actions undertaken by that establishment. This is not
dissimilar to heads of companies or institutions who resign in the wake of a
scandal in order to maintain public confidence in the organization, even though
they did not themselves participate in or know about the wrongdoing.
One way to look at representative responsibility returns to the complicity
model and its requirement for public knowledge of the means. In large, complex
organizations like militaries, it is impossible for every individual to know what
every other member is doing. An infantryman is aware of what his squad,
platoon, and company are engaged in, but has less knowledge of other members
of his brigade and very little of other divisions or corps. Without knowing, he
cannot condemn or condone any actual means employed, only what he believes
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to be the means. The higher a soldier is in the chain of command, the more he can
be expected to know and the more plausibly one can say that his will was
manifested in the pursuit of collective goals. Different standards will apply to
executives than to ordinary participants in an organized group.
Another approach is to extract what it really means when someone says he is
“obeying orders.” To do this, let us start with an epistemic proceduralist
approach (from the deliberative democracy literature) and the sanitizing process
of military hierarchical organization as described by David Estlund. Under the
right conditions, says Estlund—for which he proposes “consultative epistocracy:
an elite of wise and reliable decision-makers [who] make the decisions after
consulting the views of the many”—a soldier is “morally obligated . . . to follow
all normally binding orders,” consistent with jus in bello, even if the war itself is
unjust.9 Because he follows orders generated by a morally-acceptable and
epistemically-reliable process, his obedience and any ensuing immoral behavior is
“sanitized” even if he knows, whether through personal information or
otherwise, that the war is wrong.10 Not only is he not personally responsible for
injustices he commits by perpetuating the war, but he is morally obligated to
commit them.11 In a process similar to a jury trial, such an “epistemic
authoritative procedure” sanitizes a soldier’s otherwise impermissible actions.12
How so? Elsewhere, Estlund argues that people have sufficient reasons to believe
in the original authority of a jury system, and invokes Locke to say that an
organized justice system in which people are judged and either punished or
convincingly exonerated so as to preclude private justice is far better than the
anarchy that would otherwise result.13 In this way, Estlund analogizes between
the jury system and the “epistemic procedural” form of deliberative democracy.
This can also be analogized to the military hierarchy. Without some protection
for individuals who commit mistakes or wrongs in conjunction with the collective
activity, organizations and states would not be able to function effectively.
Hierarchical organization is a process for dealing with insurmountable
information constraints on the individual, particularly in war or with classified
9Estlund 2007, pp. 215, 221, 223–4.
10Ibid., p. 213.
11Good procedures will not always generate the right or the best outcomes. Procedures are
assumed to be fallible (ibid., p. 218), and mistakes generated will at least be honest ones, falling
within an acceptable standard (ibid. p. 221). Estlund advocates a “range of error” criterion for
obedience, determined by “whether the command is (or is not) too far from a just response, in light
of a reasonable view of the facts, by a legitimate authority that has, in a publicly recognizable way,
a general capacity to respect justice of waging and fighting wars” (ibid., pp. 230–1).
12Ibid., p. 224. Estlund denies that this treats soldiers as less than autonomous agents: “There are
ways in which we ought to be instruments of larger systems in a certain sense. . . . Sometimes the
responsible and courageous conclusion is to acknowledge a moral obligation to obey a command
even though you disagree with it, and even though, in your own view, others will be unjustly
harmed . . . nothing here tells the soldier to ignore [whether the order is just] . . . what you ought to
do when it is unjust is another [matter] . . . agency is hardly incompatible with . . . having moral
duties of obedience. Obedience is a substantive moral question that agents must face” (ibid.,
pp. 228–9).
13Estlund 2008, p. 140.
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information, and is the only way that a military can operate. Even if a person has
relevant knowledge in a particular case, preserving the system of decision-making
(provided that it is a good one) might yield the greatest overall utility. It might
also be the case that a person is stuck between two injustices in the midst of a just
process—the injustice of the order and the injustice of disobedience—and in some
cases, the injustice of the order may be the lesser.
What is a soldier or any subordinate in such a system actually saying when he
claims, “I was only obeying orders,” and that his actions, individually right or
wrong, are sanitized as a result? He is really offering an abbreviated justification
for the epistemic procedure that generated that order. Because the epistemic
procedure specified is consultative, it was chosen with the input of the many, with
their wide and varied knowledge. As a result, it is assumed that all qualified
points of view believe that this procedure is more likely to generate
demographically-neutral and substantively-valuable goals and to assign more
appropriate orders in their pursuit.14 It is on those grounds that the consultative
epistocratic procedure commands moral authority.
So the full version of the defense the soldier gives when he says that he “obeys
orders” is as follows: (a) there is an epistemically-valuable process that was
developed through consultation with the many, of which I or my representative
is included; (b) this process generates orders for me; (c) whether or not an
individual order I now receive is unjust or incorrect, it is just that the order be
obeyed, because the process has practical value (as the only method by which a
military could function) and moral authority (because of the way in which the
process was developed); and (d) I obeyed the command in order to behave justly.
In saying “I was only following orders,” then, a person actually offers a deep,
rather than shallow, justification of the procedures that generated his orders and
sanitized his actions.
In doing so, he sets himself up not only as a subordinate of the system, but also
as its representative. His responsibilities become clearer when one considers that
if it is the case that a person must carry out even incorrect orders issued from an
epistemically-valuable process but is immunized from blame or responsibility in
unjust happenstances, then he must also take some responsibility for the
organization’s mistakes although he is personally innocent in that situation. The
sanitation of his actions comes at a price.
Suppose the person turns out to be wrong about the justness of the epistemic
procedure and the institutional apparatus that generated his orders. Based on his
“following orders” defense, he can be held responsible for having complied with
those commands on the grounds that he was assumed to have reflected on and
endorsed the process, regardless of whether his particular actions were right or
14I analogize from Estlund’s jury system analogy, which he says compels a duty to obey even orders
one might believe to be incorrect in part because it has, “in a way that all qualified points of view can
accept, a decent tendency to make accurate judgments of guilt or innocence, and to assign appropriate
punishments” (ibid., p. 146).
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wrong. In the case of the military, when its government has been overthrown and
deemed unjust, its individual members, as representatives, are responsible for
having perpetrated the illegitimate regime and should accordingly be held
accountable. Any unjust orders they heeded might be forgiven so long as the
process behind them was satisfactory, but if the process itself is discovered to be
unacceptable, then its members are considered to have understood and
knowingly endorsed the nature of the institution that commanded them. Such is
the nature of representation.
Does this argument work in the context of an illiberal regime, where there was
presumably little consultation,much lessdemocraticdeliberation, indeveloping the
military’s epistocracy? Yes, because consultation, deliberation, and democracy are
not at all essential to the Nuremberg defense. The case for rejecting a simple claim
ofobedienceandholding thepersonresponsibleasa representative ismuchstronger
when there is consultation, deliberation, or democracy, but it is not dependent on
them. A person can be expected to have some rudimentary knowledge of the process
by which his orders were issued and he can be duly represented in that process even
without his individual consultation or deliberation. (See (a) above.) If the agent did
not endorse the system he was representing, he would not offer a defense grounded
in obedience but rather something else, such as survival, and he might say instead,
“I had no choice but to obey because my own livelihood was at stake. What would
youhavemedo?” Inherent inaNurembergdefense is theassumption that theorders
were justly obeyed.
Are there no instances in which good-faith belief in a flawed system would be
exonerated?Itmayseemwrongtoholdsomeoneresponsible ifhegenuinelybelieved
that the justice of the process was being looked after elsewhere. Perhaps an
additional moral mechanism—an objective standard for the quality of faith in a
system’s epistemic reliability with regard to jus ad bellum—is needed to fully
determine whether a soldier should be accountable for his obedience to a mistaken
system.
Definitive formulation of the criteria is too ambitious a task for this article, so
here, I merely offer one possibility for a standard containing two parts.
(1) The regime’s ideology must be endorsable on Kantian republican grounds.
The republic requires actual ratification of the law by either the people or
their representatives, but universal and actual consent to the just social
contract is impossible. So, under non-ideal conditions, Kant proposes a
minimal standard of legitimization consistent with the spirit of
republicanism, by evaluating what people could reasonably agree to even if
at present they might refuse it if asked.15 Legislators are obligated to
produce laws that the people, as a whole, would vote for were they to do so.
This determines how much the law conforms with right. As for what a
15Kant [1793] 2006, 8:297, pp. 296–7.
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people could reasonably agree to, we should consider the content of a
system’s self-stated ideology and its structure, such as its checks and
balances, transparency, and so on. If the regime cannot be endorsed on
those grounds, then it fails the standard of reliability, and any faith
professed in the system’s ability to generate epistemically-correct orders
regarding jus ad bellum is unwarranted. If the regime passes this first test of
endorsability, then we go to the second.
(2) A regime’s practices must reasonably approximate its rhetoric. If the two
are and have been fairly consistent, then a soldier’s faith in the system’s
epistemic reliability is warranted and he can be exonerated. If there is a
large gap—e.g., the regime waxes poetic about freedom and equality in a
worker’s paradise, yet regularly sends its citizens to gulags for imagined
transgressions, or it urges people to “dare to think, dare to act,”16 but
censors and punishes dissenters harshly—then he knows the system is
unreliable. His belief in its ability to arrive at the correct jus ad bellum
answer is thus indefensible, and he should be lustrated as its representative.
Accordingly, who should be exempted for their good-faith belief? In reality,
probably only representatives of liberal democracies—regimes with endorsable
ideologies and reasonably-consistent behavior—would qualify. Even if the system
was wrong about a particular war, belief in its overall reliability would be
legitimate.17 Those representing regimes with either unendorsable ideology or
endorsable ideology but contradictory behavior—and who therefore had relevant
information with which to deduce that the system generated unreliable
outcomes—should be lustrated. Under those circumstances, mistaken good-faith
in the system’s epistemic reliability is hardly reasonable.18
What about the person who obeys orders knowing that the procedure
generating them is illegitimate? Take Bernard Williams’ example of George, the
scientist opposed to chemical and biological warfare, whose acceptance of a
supervisory role in such a lab could allow him to sabotage the research or at least
prevent a more zealous colleague from taking charge and pushing it along more
rapidly.19 Christiano adds some details to the scenario—it is a Nazi-affiliated lab
and George does not believe Nazis should possess chemical weapons—and says
that while George would be right to take the job given the circumstances, the
authority he obeys in that role would be illegitimate.20
16This Great Leap Forward slogan encouraged increased production and commune formation.
17Reliability is about generating good results more often than not, so mistakes in particular
instances do not necessarily mean the soldier’s faith is unwarranted.
18There is some convergence of the quality of a regime with the quality of faith in it, on the “good”
end of the spectrum of regimes. The more transparent, self-checking, and historically-acceptable the
regime, the more likely that belief in it was well-placed, as “good” systems possess multiple indicators
of acceptability. Convergence comes apart at the other end, however. One could have good-quality
faith in a bad system if an ideologically-malevolent regime lives up to its promises.
19Smart and Williams 1973.
20Christiano 2004.
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Assuming this is right, George would still be accountable for heeding the
commands of the illegitimate regime and for his work in the lab. George has
thought about the process that generates his orders and does not endorse it, but
in taking the job, he chooses to comply and also explicitly conveys to others an
acceptance of the system and its authority. George had some choice here; the
same would be true even if he had none. Although things would have been worse
overall had he refused the job, in accepting it, he knowingly takes responsibility
for what happens as a result of his work. If he was successful in slowing down or
sabotaging the lab, then he is also responsible for preventing worse things from
happening, and credit for that other aspect of his actions should simultaneously
be given.21
C. THE NATURE OF POLITICAL APPOINTMENTS
Although it may appear unseemly and hypocritical to usher in a new liberal
system by lustrating whole groups without regard for individual culpability in a
manner more reminiscent of its predecessor, systematic purging is not unknown
and, under some circumstances, perfectly acceptable in liberal democracies where
election of a new president or prime minister is accompanied by fervent jockeying
for political appointments in his administration. Heads of ministries (defense,
treasury, education, etc.) and their assistants, and in some countries the
ambassadors and special envoys as well, start looking for other jobs, and new
people prepare to take their place. This kind of elite turnover is entirely
routine—everyone expects it, no one complains, and it happens all the time.
Liberal democracies exercise what Weber calls “legal (or rational) authority
with a bureaucratic administrative staff.”22 People in authority positions,
including elected heads of state and legislators, hold offices. As such, their
authority and their commands are impersonal. Similarly, subordinates obey
orders in their capacity as “members” of the political organization23, and the
loyalty they confer is impersonal and directed at the office, not at the rotating cast
of persons occupying the position.
Lower-level civil servants are unaffected by elite turnover. As demanding as
their jobs are, ordinary bureaucrats are not policy-makers in the broadest sense,
nor are they responsible for the successes or failures of particular policies. They
exercise “technical expertise,” rather than broad vision or leadership, and they
organize, facilitate, and carry out policy decisions regardless of the content and
21George’s single action—working at the lab in order to sabotage the program from within—has
multiple moral valences. Insofar as he prevented worse things from happening, it is
morally-praiseworthy. At the same time, working at the lab is morally-blameworthy, and that is not
erased by the moral goodness of his goal, even if the goal is only achievable by engaging in
morally-wrong acts. His single act has at least two simultaneous and conflicting moral facets, and he
should be both praised and blamed.
22Weber [1922] 1947, pp. 328–9.
23Ibid., p. 330.
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irrespective of which branch of government orders them.24 They are, therefore,
immune while high-level appointments are given and taken away with each new
administration because of, simply, the political nature of the top appointments.
Heads of ministries and other political appointments are given significant
freedom and expected to exercise a fair amount of discretion in developing and
promoting the head of state’s policies and overall political vision. Presumably, the
population elected the president or prime minister because it wanted his
proposals carried out; as all heads of state must delegate much of that work to
others, he should be free to install like-minded and trustworthy people in major
policy-making positions. In that respect, political appointees are extensions of the
head of state and, as part of his team, they come and go with the fortunes of the
elected official.25 As for legislators and the head of state himself, political
appointments made from below are subject to the same fate, and in a regime
change, they are tied to the fortunes of the population that selected them and/or
tacitly endorsed the political system in which they held office.
While some top military positions in liberal democracies are political
appointments, such as the United States’ head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
average soldier in a liberal democracy is more like a civil servant who should be
protected from the turbulence at the top of the political food chain than a
political appointee whose own views ought to support the head of state’s,
because he is loyal to the office and not to the person occupying it. Says Weber,
“The modern army is essentially a bureaucratic organization administered by
that peculiar type of military functionary, ‘the officer.’”26 One result of such
bureaucratic organization is
the dominance of a spirit of formalistic impersonality, ‘Sine ira et studio,’ without
hatred or passion, and hence without affection or enthusiasm. The dominant norms
are concepts of straightforward duty with regard to personal considerations.27
Soldiers will feel passion more so than the average bureaucrat, but it is a
patriotism for military institution and country. “Following orders” has a special
and distinct place in military morality, and soldiers learn to fulfill their duties
regardless of their opinions on a particular war or the policies leading to it.
In liberal democracies, the separation of powers (whether into legislative,
executive, and judicial branches or with a combined legislative/executive)
24Ibid., pp. 333–4.
25Adequate “solidarity of interests” between the “chief and his administrative staff as opposed to
the subjects” on ideological and material grounds is essential in any type of system, not just
rational-legal ones (ibid., pp. 327, 383).
26Ibid., pp. 334–5. Later, Weber says that “the modern army officer is a type of appointed official
who is clearly marked off by certain class distinctions” (ibid., p. 336). This appears to contradict my
argument, but when this was published in 1922, modern army officers were pre-WWII creatures, who
came primarily from the upper classes and who formed a mini-class of their own. Now, however, most
officers acquire their positions by virtue of completing a strict training regimen and passing grueling
tests. Only top commanders, such as generals and colonels, are subject to appointment.
27Ibid., p. 340.
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provides some check on the use of military might. Because the military answers
primarily to a single branch of government (usually the executive), checks by the
other branches (perhaps by withholding funds, refusing to declare war, or hearing
military cases in court) mean that it is not the private instrument of the executive.
In addition, the head of the military in a liberal democracy is usually a civilian,
and top military commanders report directly to him or his appointee. This
structure reinforces the idea that the military is merely a policy tool, rather than
an interest group of its own, and its members are simply parts that make it run.
The combination of a separation of powers and the structure of civil-military
relations makes the average soldier in a liberal democracy just like a civil-servant
bureaucrat, albeit one with deadlier skills and better uniforms.
In illiberal regimes, however, the rank-and-file soldier is more like a political
appointee than a career civil servant, and soldiers should be subject to the
turnover that accompanies that kind of work. Without separation of powers, no
other branch has a say in how the military is utilized, so the average soldier
knows that he is more beholden to the executive than to any other and that he can
be its private and exclusive tool.28 Without strong civilian oversight and strict
separation between military and civilian leadership, the civil-military political
structure and the military in practice lack the reinforcing principle that it is
merely an instrument for national well-being and not a policy player or separate
interest group.
In many ways, illiberal regimes are more like traditional than rational systems
of authority. Although Weber includes socialist states (which have historically
been illiberal) with liberal democracies in the category of rational systems, at the
time of his death in 1920, he had not yet seen the full manifestation of the
socialist form of rational-legal authority, which actually practices many
traditional aspects of governance.29 I depart from Weber by making a distinction
between liberal and illiberal systems that does not overlap cleanly with his
typology and by arguing that, in some important ways, illiberal regimes more
closely resemble traditional systems of authority.
28Without effective separation of powers, says Weber, “this system involves the complete
appropriation of all powers by the party organization in control at the time” (ibid., p. 418). In
rational systems, administration is separated from ownership of the means of production, and
administration must render an account of the resources provided for its use. Property belonging to the
organization (and controlled by the office) is separated from the official’s personal property (ibid., pp.
331–2). In non-rational systems, however, this separation breaks down to varying degrees; ownership
and control of resources (property and labor) are more personal.
29Weber was probably thinking of nineteenth-century monarchical nation-states as examples of
rational-legal yet illiberal regimes. In contemporary times, however, perhaps only Singapore’s
highly-legalistic dictatorship under Lee Kuan Yew and the People’s Action Party qualifies as both
illiberal and rational-legal. Few other twentieth or twenty-first century systems come to mind. Taiwan
under the Kuomingtang or Mexico in the late days of Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)-rule had
significant corruption problems, and Saudi Arabia’s seemingly rational-legal sharia law co-exists
alongside the traditional executive rule of kings and princes, in a land with no written constitution
(Feldman 2008, pp. 92–102). That there is perhaps only one contemporary example of an illiberal
rational-legal system, and many examples of illiberal traditional ones, is quite telling.
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In traditional societies, the head of state increases his personal power by
acquiring that position, and his administrative staff is made up not of “officials,”
but rather of personal retainers, which often include military forces.30 Obedience
is owed to the person rather than the position, and
obligations of obedience on the basis of personal loyalty are essentially unlimited.
There is thus a double sphere: on the one hand, of action which is bound to specific
tradition; on the other hand, of that which is free of any specific rules.31
Traditional authority systems lack several important traits of genuine
bureaucratic administrative staffs, including a “clearly defined sphere of
competence subject to impersonal rules,” “rational ordering of relations of
superiority and inferiority,” and “a regular system of appointment and
promotion on the basis of free contract.”32 Illiberal regimes are characterized by
absence of the rule of law, insufficient protections for individual rights, and little
freedom of conscience, speech, and economic activity—all features they share
with traditional societies.
The militaries of illiberal regimes range widely in form, from warlord armies
in Somalia and Afghanistan (whose authority over their fighters is deeply
personal) on one end of the spectrum to Soviet-style militaries (which look
rational-legal in many ways but retain many traditional elements) on the other.
Like all militaries, illiberal ones are hierarchical and their members are expected
to obey superior orders without question. Administrative organizations in
traditional societies can still employ a structure of “promotion on a basis of
seniority or of particular objectively determined achievements,”33 which
maintains many of the key features of rational bureaucracies so that they appear
rational-legal on the surface.
However, their militaries all embody illiberal and traditional features,
including lack of separation of powers and little or no protection against
indentured servitude. Training soldiers includes teaching them important political
principles, such as what their duties are and to whom or what they owe their
loyalty. Without the separation of powers or a civilian commander embedded at
the top of the structure, even regular soldiers are aware that they are not mere
tools, but more intimately tied to the policymaker and therefore personal
representatives of him and his office. Although all militaries maintain strict
hierarchies in order to function properly, their respective ethos reflect the core
values of the countries they serve. Militaries of liberal societies are similarly
governed by rule of law, their processes (e.g., for advancement or court martial)
are transparent, and indentured servitude is not allowed. A sergeant can make his
troops crawl through a swamp for days or do hundreds of push-ups, but he





cannot order them to mow his lawn. Soldiers obey the sergeant only insofar as he
is a representative of the state, and not the sergeant personally. In militaries of
illiberal societies, however, the opposite is more likely: processes are more opaque
and subject to nepotism, and there is little freedom of conscience and some
indentured servitude. This last feature is extremely important, because the idea
that soldiers are not personal servants of their superiors is absent from the
society—neither instituted in practice nor recognized in the books.
A brief look at the Soviet military illustrates that the rational-legal nature of
illiberal militaries is more apparent than real. The USSR should have been an
exemplar of illiberal but rational-legal systems; yet its military was plagued with
horrifyingly brutal and widespread hazing of conscripts, senior soldiers stealing
personal items from new recruits, and indentured servitude.34 Not only was
military authority highly personalized, but the military was subject to thorough
political indoctrination that taught loyalty not just to the country, but to the
Communist Party in particular.35 And lest one think that the Russian military has
become less politically-charged since the collapse of Communism, active-duty
military officers are not only legally allowed but encouraged to run for political
office, and hundreds have done so since 1991.36,37
These are but a few examples of how a seemingly rational-legal system of
governance can actually operate according to very traditional forms of authority.
34Suvorov 1982, pp. 216–7, 221–3. Barany 2007, pp. 64–5. Reese 2000, pp. 150–5. Soldiers were
rented out as laborers or ordered to lay brick at officers’ homes, underscoring the extremely personal
nature of military service (Barany 2007, pp. 64–5; Reese 2000, p. 170). They also sought their
commanders’ favor by brutally jockeying with each other to offer their personal services, such as
lighting officers’ cigarettes, in order to win the prize of being able to polish the officer’s boots
(Suvorov 1982, pp. 233, 237).
35As in other Communist militaries, the zampolit (political officer) played an important role in the
Soviet army, and had no equivalent in other Western militaries. He managed the army’s party
organization and oversaw its “political socialization,” that is, the indoctrination of military personnel
with approved values and attitudes (Jones 1985, p. 115). The Soviets attempted to create Party cells
in each company and, in the 1930’s, purged officers for incorrect, especially Trotskyite, Communist
beliefs (Reese 2000, pp. 71, 88). Soviet and other Communist soldiers were instilled with loyalty to
specific rulers, in this case the Communist Party (Jones 1985, p. 123). Proper ideology and loyalty to
the country are important in any military, but permeation of political party activities demonstrates a
very personal, traditional bond to the ruler (in this case a party), as opposed to a more rational-legal
and impersonal loyalty to the country and form of governance, regardless of who might happen to
rule.
36Barany 2007, pp. 4, 9, 78–80, 93. In contrast, American active-duty military officers have been
forbidden from holding Foreign Service appointments since 1868 and from holding elected or
appointed civil offices since 1870 (United States [1871] 1963, Sec. 18, p. 319). Department of Defense
Directive 1344.10 lists current restrictions.
37Abolishing Party domination over the military created a vacuum, and subsequent attempts to
assert civilian control led to a power struggle between the executive and legislative branches, which
the president (Yeltsin) won in 1993: “The resultant system of civilian control . . . is a personalistic and
unregulated arrangement based on the president’s overwhelming political power and his ability to
play off institutions and individuals against each other” (Barany 2007, p. 85).
Regarding Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia over South Ossetia, for example, The Economist
points to several causes, including complicated geopolitical maneuvering vis-à-vis the West and
NATO, but also notes, “Putin’s personal hatred of . . . Saakashvili, and his ability to deploy the entire
Russian army to fulfill his vendetta, made war all but inevitable” (Anon 2008).
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Even ordinary soldiers in those illiberal regimes understand this dynamic; so
soldiers at all levels of these militaries are more like political appointments and
should expect to be let go when the executive is deposed.
D. CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND DISSOLUTION OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT
A society’s civil-military structure and the ethical and patriotic training it gives its
soldiers reflect the underlying foundational values and principles of the political
system the military serves and the social contract upon which service is based.
Whenever society’s fundamental beliefs, political structure, and legal code are
overhauled—not simply fine-tuned—the military must also be refashioned to suit,
because it was responsible for the country’s security and was trained in and
guaranteed the value system being discarded. Now that the previous system is
considered wrong, having defended it is also wrong. The classic post-war
examples of Germany and Japan demonstrate the need to drastically transform
the military’s very essence in order to complement and complete the parallel
changes in the broader political and social system.
In a new system, that is, under a new social contract, the new regime need not
honor the old contract’s obligations. With regime change, one of two things will
be dissolved—the demos or the regime, the society or the government. In some
cases, only government is dissolved. This happens “from within,” usually because
of abuses of power,38 such as by coups against corrupt, totalitarian, or otherwise
failing regimes. On those occasions, society’s boundaries remain largely intact
and the people themselves remain, as a people, but they must renegotiate their
desired form of governance:
[W]hen the Government is dissolved, the People are at liberty to provide for
themselves, by erecting a new Legislative, differing from the other, by the change of
persons, or Form, or both as they shall find it most for their safety and good.39
At other times, regime change dissolves the whole society. The “usual, and almost
only way” this happens is through foreign conquest, says Locke. When the
boundaries of society and of the “people” are drastically altered—perhaps the
people are subsumed into another country or enough are killed or scattered such
that they can no longer be said to constitute a group—society itself dissolves, and
the people return to a state of nature, free to create a new society. (If incorporated
into a new society and contract, however, they are unlikely to return to a state of
nature in between.) Foreign invasions do not always end in empire or absorption
38Locke [1690] 1979, II §§211, 212, 222, 227. (“II” refers to the Second Treatise, on Civil
Government.) A state of war exists when there is “no common Superior on Earth to appeal to for
relief,” in response to force (II §19). When war-induced regime change dissolves the government or
society (II §211), the Lockean cycle calls for a new social contract to bring people out of the resulting
state, whether of war or nature.
39Ibid., II §220.
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of the losing country, so foreign conquests may only dissolve the government. On
the other hand, internal dissolutions might also break up the society, as with the
USSR or Yugoslavia.
Whether government or society dissolves, two arguments can be made for the
old contract’s obligations not being binding on the new regime and allowing it to
dismiss, as a group, military personnel from the former establishment for doing
nothing except having served. The first takes the social contract metaphor more
literally, for instance, as contemporary Hobbesians do.40 Individuals in a society
governed by an illiberal regime can be said to have agreed to that contract under
duress. When the contract is extreme enough, it could be declared invalid or
forcibly renegotiated under the standard of unconscionability. (Circumstances
typically include fraud, misrepresentation, duress, mistake, impossibility, or lack
of actual agreement.) Usually, unconscionability is invoked when a contract is
deemed so unfair or immoral that it is appalling and thought that no reasonable
party would agree to it.41 It considers both substantive and procedural aspects of
the agreement, and is often applied to situations in which there is gross
asymmetry in the parties’ relative bargaining strengths. Such extreme coercion
often exists in illiberal regimes, and the society ends up with an illegitimate
contract,42 the terms of which cannot be binding. Because their soldiers
participated in, supported, and were bound by a regime that should never have
existed, not only were the soldiers not beholden to the illegitimate contract at
the time, but neither now is the new regime, so it need not honor the previous
terms.
Most people take the social contract more metaphorically, however, and
another argument could be made along those lines. Locke says that people would
not have given up certain rights in a just social contract43—especially property
rights44 and religious liberties45—so any contract that makes such demands is a
false one. The stipulation is that, using Rousseau’s language, one can distinguish
between “true” (here, liberal) contracts and nominal (here, illiberal) ones in this
way, and that the latter are illegitimate and non-binding on present participants
as well as their successors.
Soldiers under the old system who want to remain in this employ may no
longer qualify if new rules exclude participation on the basis of
newly-undesirable traits, notably service to the old regime. Despite expectations
for continued employment, they may be lustrated and their contracts terminated,
when previously-existing terms no longer apply. At the very least, they are not
40See, for example, Hampton (1986), Kavka (1986), Gauthier (1986), and Buchanan (1975).
41Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co. (1965) and U.S. Uniform Commercial Code (2010)
§2–302.
42Rousseau [1754] 1964, p. 168.




owed their jobs, the terms of employment they agreed to when signing on, or
their pensions.46
This is not to say that new regime cannot honor them, if that is desirable and
expedient; nor, for that matter, are basic human rights completely thrown out and
reaffirmed each time. Rather, it is the old society’s specific institutional
obligations—in particular, employment contracts—that are no longer valid and
binding.
Whether the demos or government is dissolved, the state of nature is not a
free-for-all. There are still natural duties outside of civil society, such as duties of
mutual aid and not causing harm or unnecessary suffering. Moreover, they
pertain
without regard to our voluntary acts . . . they have no necessary connection with
institutions or social practices; their content is not, in general, defined by the rules
of these arrangements . . . they hold between persons irrespective of their
institutional relationships; they obtain between all as equal moral persons. In this
sense the natural duties are owed not only to definite individuals, say to those
cooperating together in a particular social arrangement, but to persons generally.47
While there are no strong obligations to people under the previous system (e.g.,
they are not owed the pensions they expected), it does not mean that anything at
all can be done to them. They cannot be taken out into the woods and summarily
shot. Basic rights are not up for grabs. The new regime owes everyone natural
duties, but nothing more, and it gets to decide which of the old obligations it
wants to honor.
II. LUSTRATION IN PRACTICE
Although lustration is morally justifiable to liberals, from a liberal perspective, it
will still cause uneasiness, and rightly so. Such collective judgment is consistent
with recognizing individual wrongdoing, however. Lustration charges groups
with responsibility, not necessarily guilt, and this assessment remains separate
from the punishment portion of lustration. A group agent may be complicit, for
example, and thus responsible, even when not all its members are guilty. Of
course, punishments are meted out to individuals, but one can be punished on
grounds of strict liability instead of mens rea, that is, for his responsibility and
46Locke ([1690] 1979, II §87) says that political society exists only when everyone has agreed to
forego private judgments and punishments. In relinquishing his natural executive powers, man must
also authorize the making and execution of public laws on his behalf (ibid., II §89). Public laws create
responsibilities and obligations specific to the particular civil society in place, beyond any natural
duties. When a particular government (or society) dissolves, your political and legal obligations to
that establishment similarly dissolve, because they were created under and tied to a specific contract.
When the contract no longer exists, you no longer owe those obligations to others who were in
contract with you; they also no longer owe you.
47Rawls 1999, pp. 98–9. See also Locke [1690] 1979, II §7.
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not his guilt.48 But when individual blame can be apportioned, individual
punishments may be accommodated, in which case special circumstances
(mitigating or exacerbating) could lessen or enhance sentences after general
punishment is imposed. In order to individuate punishments, however, relevant
and reliable information is needed about a person’s particular actions, and that
availability will vary according to circumstances.
Individuating punishment is also hindered by other realities of warfare. For
example, peace treaties often times do not confer blank slates on the victors but
are, rather, negotiated settlements of the conditions of conquest, which may
include official protections against lustration for ruling groups. The latter might
also retain informal bargaining power in the post-war process if the victor
worries about alienating the population. Whether residual bargaining power is
formally- or informally-held, it is merely one of many ways in which fully-just
outcomes are rendered impossible. The frequency of such circumstances forces us
to ask what good the abstract theory is, if there is always a gap between moral
permissibility and facts on the ground.
But philosophy can still shed light on what is acceptable even if real-world
circumstances never approach theoretical ones, by helping us decide how to
implement the terms of defeat. An analogy to the ideal/non-ideal distinction may
be helpful here. According to Rawls, ideal theory is required because it informs
and constrains non-ideal theory by providing goals and insights on how we
should proceed under unfavorable conditions.49 Similarly, just war theory should
inform our actions even when fully-just outcomes are impossible under messy or
difficult circumstances.
After a war, many factors compete with the imperative to lustrate, including
the need to buy off former ruling groups, balancing turnover with stability,
minimizing corruption, proceeding with reconstruction, promoting
reconciliation, and avoiding undue recrimination in order to build a strong civil
48Strict liability is legal responsibility for injury or damages even when the person is not at fault
or negligent. It can apply to certain tort activities (e.g., holding an employer responsible for an
employee’s work-related wrong-doing or negligence) and to consumer goods (e.g., making sellers of
defective or dangerous products responsible for harm to the user) (Black’s Law Dictionary 1990,
p. 1422).
Mens rea—“a guilty mind,” i.e., having wrongful purpose, criminal intent, or guilty knowledge
and willfulness—is one element of criminal responsibility (ibid., p. 985). In many legal systems,
criminal guilt requires both wrongful action and mens rea. Intent to perform the crime is sufficient but
unnecessary for mens rea, as reckless negligence or foreseeing unintended side effects could also
qualify.
49Although justice is a “cautious, jealous virtue,” ideal theory provides “the only basis for the
systematic grasp of these more pressing problems [of partial compliance]. . . . I shall assume that a
deeper understanding can be gained in no other way, and that the nature and aims of a perfectly just
society is the fundamental part of the theory of justice” (Rawls 1999, p. 8). Only then can we
determine what principles to adopt under unjust and unfavorable circumstances (ibid., pp. 215–6).
For example, says Rawls, the principles of cooperation and non-violence embodied within ideal
theory enable us to condemn violent protest within a “more or less just democratic state for those
citizens who recognize and accept the legitimacy of the constitution” (ibid., p. 319) and to see that
non-violent protest like civil disobedience and conscientious objection, though illegal, can actually
promote justice and stability (ibid., p. 336).
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society. Moral theory may tell us that certain types of concessions or justifications
in order to end a war are never acceptable, even under non-ideal constraints. It
will also indicate which arguments for or against lustration are legitimate, and
therefore which should be used or discarded.
For example, both the Japanese people and the emperor retained so much
informal bargaining power after WWII that the U.S. not only excluded Hirohito
from the Tokyo war crimes tribunal, but preemptively absolved him of any
involvement in or responsibility for the war. Despite the far-reaching scope of
indictments against Japanese leadership and military personnel, the emperor was
exempted because: (1) Japanese emperor-worship was so strong that punishing
him in any way would alienate the population, so an inviolable (if human)
emperor was necessary to facilitate successful post-war occupation and reform;
and (2) he was, in any case, an innocent figurehead who lacked knowledge of and
guilt for the war.50
Should the emperor have been lustrated along with everyone else? The first
justification was highly suspect. Sometimes, something close to blank-slate
conditions actually exist. The population was decimated, terrified, demoralized,
and starving. In reality, they probably would have accepted anything—certainly
the deposition of their emperor, perhaps even his execution.
This leaves us with the second reason, that he was not guilty. In fact, the
emperor’s innocence was a popular myth; he gave orders for, approved, or
understood everything that went on. For the sake of argument, however, let us
assume that he was not in any way involved with or had relevant knowledge of
the bloody war waged in his name. It does not matter. This article tells us that in
the absence of compelling prudential concerns—and it seems the costs of
deposing the emperor were grossly overestimated—Hirohito should have been
lustrated along with everyone else. Innocence by itself is not enough to exclude
someone from lustration. If that was the deciding factor, then the U.S. was wrong
to have not deposed the emperor.51
The ramifications of that failure were significant, and long-lasting. Excluding
the emperor only enhanced the arbitrariness of the “victor’s justice.” It also
squandered a limited opportunity to force ordinary Japanese to confront their
own responsibility for the war in a serious way, rather than simply adapt to the
realities of losing.
50See Dower (1999) and Bix (2000) for historical details regarding Japan.
51In cases like this, lustration could be symbolic (e.g., public reprimands, purification rituals, or
truth-and-reconciliation commissions) and co-opted former leaders made to publicly recant the war
and accept responsibility for wrong-doing. It may be lip service, but it is not devoid of meaning or
effect. Lustration does not mandate exclusion from future political life, as declaration of
responsibility and actual punishment are separate. Responsible parties may even retain their offices,
if their moral or practical authority will prove useful, or if they will cause more trouble than it is
worth if not given power in the new regime, for instance, by forming reactionary groups and
continuing the fight informally. In the latter case, it might be wise to co-opt and otherwise distract
them with authority positions from which they can do little harm, perhaps in the Ministry of Silly
Walks.
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The near blank-slate conditions in Japan were not properly used, but often,
victors are legitimately constrained. The most pressing factors are probably
threefold: (1) peace settlement terms and parties’ residual bargaining powers
(above), (2) available resources, and (3) the country’s physical and social
instability. In light of other urgent post-war demands, the new regime may not
have the considerable resources required to adequately investigate alleged crimes
and assess responsibility, and opt instead for symbolic or less-individuated
lustration. Furthermore, extensive infrastructure projects will favor keeping more
of the military (provided it has the relevant skills), while doubts about military
loyalty to the new regime would tend toward purging.
Finally, when turbulent regime change follows harsh oppression, stability can
be tenuous, and it is essential to begin building or repairing civil bonds. The best
way to do that will depend on how society was oppressed. The latter-20th century
oppressions in Latin America and Central Europe differed in part because Latin
American repression was “deep,” while Central European repression was “broad.”
The former group of victims was fairly clear and finite, having been tortured,
murdered, or made to “disappear” by equally-limited groups of perpetrators
(usually military, police, and death squads), while in the latter, regimes were
propped up by “a much larger number of people exerting less violent or explicit
pressureonamuch largernumber.Manypeoplewereonbothsides.”52 EastGerman
Stasi often blackmailed people into becoming state informants by deliberately
arresting them for minor crimes; similarly, rather than blatantly censoring the
foreign press, the Soviet government more subtly tried to entice married foreign
reporters with bevies of women, hoping to gain leverage by ensnaring one. Higher
rates and lesser levels of complicity overall meant that many were less clearly
either victims or perpetrators but more often both, and partly responsible for their
own repression and that of others, even as they were themselves victimized.53
In comparing Latin America with Central Europe, then, one might recommend
harsher lustration for the former. When the group of perpetrators is smaller and
more easily identifiable, separating them from the rest of society will not impact
the social fabric as much. If collaborators are strewn throughout, however, the
danger is greater. When Stasi archives were opened and records made available to
the public—so individuals could find out what information the state had gathered
and who, including family and friends, had spied on them—the repercussions for
a cohesive civil society were obvious.54
After all these considerations, it may very well be that a new regime chooses
an all-or-nothing approach to lustration, similar to what Elster advocates. But
whatever it chooses, it should do so knowingly, with awareness of the moral
52Rosenberg 1995, pp. 398–400.
53These are broad-stroked characterizations, but they illustrate how such circumstances might
factor into lustration policy.
54Ash 2000, p. 234. In fact, in several Central European countries, lustrace was a relatively mild
affair.
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considerations and implications, even as the prudential ones are inevitably
unpredictable.
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